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CONTRACTS GOVERNING THE USE OF WEBSITES
Eliza Mik*
With the progressive transformation of the Internet from a romanticised instrument of freedom and
self-expression into a commercial platform for digital distribution, most websites must be recognised
as access interfaces to a wide range of content and services. This paper examines the contracts
purportedly governing the use of such content and services. It explores the difficulties of establishing
legal intention in a context that is not unambiguously commercial or transactional and contrasts
popular beliefs with the basic principles of contract law. It draws a clear distinction between contracts
governing traditional e-commerce exchanges, such as buying books on Amazon.com, and contracts
governing the very use of websites. In the latter instance, the website (ie the resources made available
thereon) constitutes the subject matter of the transaction. Equal importance must be attributed to the
fact that such contracts are formed on websites and to the fact that they govern their use. The website
user will question the existence of a contract on the basis that he did not have an intention to be legally
bound, or had no awareness that a transaction was taking place. The website operator will argue
that, objectively, all prerequisites of a legally enforceable agreement have been met. The outcome
of the discussion will, to a large extent, depend on whether the user’s beliefs and expectations can
be regarded as reasonable and on whether it is the user or the operator who deserves the protection
of the objective theory of contract.
I. Introduction
“The marrow of contractual relationships should be the parties’ intention to create
a legal relationship.”1
This paper analyses the enforceability of contracts purporting to govern the use of
websites or, to be more precise, the content and services available thereon. The
average Internet user is familiar with contracts governing traditional e-commerce
transactions, such as buying books online. The need to enter into a contractual
relationship for the purpose of using online resources is, at least in popular opinion,
a relatively novel practice. The resulting problems create an intricate interplay
between seemingly settled legal concepts. Although the discussion touches upon the
∗ Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. I would like to express my
gratitude for the patience and support of my colleagues: Associate Professor Yihan Goh, Professor
Gerard McMeel, Professor David McLauchlan and Professor Michael Furmston. I must also thank the
anonymous reviewer for his insightful comments.
1 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR (R) 594 at para 139 (HC) [Digilandmall];
see also Phang JA in Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter [2009] 2 SLR (R) 332 at para 96 (CA)
[Gay Choon Ing]. Most references to Digilandmall concern the High Court decision.
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topic of standard term contracts, it focuses on a preliminary problem: the difficulty
of establishing an intention to be legally bound. This difficulty derives from the
fact that many online interactions occur ‘on’ websites lacking the traditional indi-
cia of transactional environments. Conventionally, the legal challenges associated
with online contracting concern the new ways in which intention is communicated.
Additional challenges arise from the new contractual subject matter. Contract law,
which has been shaped by the archetypical exchange of economic value in the form
of goods, services and money,2 must evolve to encompass exchanges in different
forms of economic value. It may thus have to adapt to new methods of communi-
cating agreement and to new forms of consideration. The scale of the problem must
be appreciated—millions of purportedly contractual relationships are formed and
performed on websites following a similar design pattern—a hyperlink is placed on
the bottom of individual webpages, its activation displays the terms governing the
particular interaction (the ‘legal link’). Going past the home page of the website,
or continued browsing, (purportedly) results in a contractual relationship between
the operator of the website and its user. The practice is employed by all major
websites. The questions arise: “are such contracts enforceable?” or “is a contract
formed between the operator and the user?” Can it be assumed that the average user
intends to create a legal relationship with the operator (eg, Google or Amazon) when
‘just browsing’? The answer to these questions requires that equal importance be
attributed to the fact that such contracts are formed on websites and to the fact that
they govern website use. While every decision will depend on its specific facts, it
is possible to advance some general arguments given the increasing standardisation
of website designs and commercial practices. The present analysis is not, how-
ever, directed at establishing whether contract law continues to apply online. This
is beyond dispute.3 Internet transactions are considered in “the usual manner.”4 In
England and Wales, online transactions are evaluated in light of, amongst others, the
E-Commerce Directive5 and the Directive on Consumer Rights,6 which frequently
override principles of contract law. Unlike their English counterparts, Singapore
Courts can apply the common law of contract in its purest form, unaffected by
regulatory interference.
A. Roadmap and Preliminaries
After some preliminary observations, the discussion commences with a brief mention
of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements. Next, the main prerequisites of enforce-
ability are explored: intention and consideration. Particular emphasis is placed on
2 Lon L Fuller, “Consideration and Form” (1941) 41 Colum L Rev 799 at 818.
3 Andrew Phang & Yeo Tiong Min, “The Impact of Cyberspace on Contract Law” in Daniel Seng, ed, The
Impact of the Regulatory Framework on E-Commerce in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore Academy of
Law, 2002) 39 at para 4.
4 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at paras 91-93. For a discussion of the separation between ‘traditional’
and ‘electronic’ contracts see: Roger Brownsword, “The Shaping of our On-line Worlds: Getting the
Regulatory Environment Right” (2012) 20 Int’l JL & IT 249 at 251, 252.
5 EC, Commission Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on electronic commerce [2000] OJ, L 178/1
[E-Commerce Directive].
6 EC, Commission Directive 2011/83/EC of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights [2011] OJ, L 304/64
[Directive on Consumer Rights].
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the fact that any difficulties in establishing legal intention may affect the issue of
consideration. The largest part of the discussion is, however, devoted to the objec-
tive theory of contract. Its application in the online environment encounters some
unexpected difficulties. The parties’ positions are diametrically opposed; the user
will question the existence of a contract on the basis that he did not have an intention
to be legally bound, or, no awareness that a transaction is taking place. The operator
will argue that, objectively, all prerequisites of a legally enforceable agreement have
been met. A difficult balancing exercise ensues: popular perceptions are contrasted
with the basic principles of contract law, objective appearances are contrasted with
‘reasonable expectations’. Lastly, the problem is approached from the perspective
of the doctrine of unilateral mistake. For the sake of brevity, the word ‘purported’
is omitted from the word ‘contract’ although it is acknowledged that the very point
of this analysis is to examine whether such ‘contracts’ are legally enforceable. Due
to space constraints, this paper does not examine agreements governing the use of
websites from a broader policy perspective. It is confined to the contractual aspects
of their enforceability.
It is important to acknowledge the controversies these agreements create in such
areas as copyright or property law. In many instances, website contracts aim to
alter the default principles of these regimes or, implicitly challenge the traditional,
statutorily sanctioned allocation of rights.7 In the US, website contracts constitute
a permanent fixture in the ‘cyberproperty debate’, which concerns the existence
of a general right to exclude others from accessing network resources.8 With the
increasing commercialisation of the Internet, websites have become gateways, or
access interfaces, to a wide range of content and services. In return for the right to use
such content and services, website operators demand that users permit the harvesting
of their personal information. User information, although traditionally discussed
in the context of privacy regulations,9 is regarded as the currency of the Internet
economy10 with a large number of online businesses built, almost exclusively, around
its collection and utilisation.11 Again, the role of private agreement in shaping rights
to personal information (particularly, their alienability) is controversial.12 Many
agreements governing the use of websites may be found unenforceable (partially or
in their entirety) because of their substance—not on the basis of the principles of
contract law.
7 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013) at 84; Jane K Winn, ed, Consumer Protection in the Age of the ‘Information
Economy’ (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006) at 3; Yochai Benkler, “An Unhurried View of Private Ordering
in Information Transactions” (2000) 53 Vand L Rev 2063.
8 Mark A Lemley, “Terms of Use” (2006) 91 Minn L Rev 459; Michael A Carrier & Greg Lastowka,
“Against Cyberproperty” (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech LJ 1485.
9 See Ian J Lloyd, Information Technology Law, 6th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 11,
12.
10 World Economic Forum, “Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class” (January 2011),
online: World Economic Forum <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNew
Asset_Report_2011.pdf>.
11 For a basic explanation see Richard Warner & Robert H Sloan, “Behavioral Advertising: From One-
Sided Chicken to Informational Norms” (2012) 15 Vand J Ent L & Prac 49 at 57-60 [Warner & Sloan,
“Behavioral Advertising”].
12 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2010) at 1-20; Robert H Sloan & Richard Warner, “Beyond Notice and
Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent” (2013) 14 Journal of High Technology Law 370.
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Before proceeding, it is important to emphasise that this paper does not deal with
websites that condition their use on the prior establishment of an account.13 In
such instance, the sign-up process involves a more explicit presentation of terms,
and on the user’s part, the provision of specific information and the activation of
additional graphical elements. Even ‘traditional’e-commerce sites likeAmazon.com
or Singaporeair.com expressly distinguish between contracts concerning the sale of
goods or services and contracts concerning the use of their website.14 While the
actual purchase of goods or tickets requires an account, use of the website does
not.
B. Click-Wraps and Browse-Wraps
The enforceability of contracts governing online transactions, including the use of
websites, is usually analysed under the labels of ‘click-wrap’ and ‘browse-wrap’
agreements. Click-wraps relate to websites that require the activation of an ‘I agree’
button as a sign of agreement to the terms presented thereon.15 Some courts insist
that users be directed to the terms or prompted to review them.16 The defining feature
of click-wraps is the requirement of a positive action other than use of the site and
the presence of a mechanism that renders the terms unavoidable. In browse-wraps,
the terms are available on the bottom of the website via a hyperlink. As assent is
given by using the website,17 it is often argued that browse-wraps do not require
an express manifestation of agreement. As there is no self-display mechanism, it is
also possible to continue browsing without viewing the terms.18 Absent evidence
of actual knowledge of or agreement to the terms, the enforceability of browse-wrap
agreements depends on whether a reasonably prudent user would be put on ‘inquiry
notice’ of their existence.19 This in turn depends on the design of the website; in par-
ticular, the conspicuousness of the link.20 Its presence at the bottom of the webpage
is generally considered insufficient.21 To date, browse-wrap agreements have been
13 Eg, Straitstimes.com, which requires a subscription to have unlimited access to all content.
14 See eg, Amazon.com, which divides its terms into ‘conditions of sale and use’, online: Amazon
<http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer>; Singapore Airlines distinguishes between terms for the
use of the website, the online booking as well as conditions of contract and conditions of carriage,
online: Singapore Airlines <http://www.singaporeair.com/en_UK/terms-conditions>. For a discussion
in a recent case see Ryanair Ltd v Billigfluege.de GmbH/Ticket Point Reiseburo GmbH [2015] IESC 11.
15 See generally Cheryl B Preston & Eli W McCann, “Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps and
Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse” (2012) 26
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 1 at 17.
16 Specht v Netscape Communications Corporation, 306 F (3d) 17 at 22, 23 (2nd Cir 2002) (applying
California law); Hines v Overstock.com, 668 F Supp (2d) 362 at 367 (ED NY 2009), aff’d 380 F App
22 (2nd Cir 2010).
17 Nancy S Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013) at 41.
18 Be In, Inc v Google Inc, 2013 WL 5568706 at 6 (ND Cal).
19 Register.com Inc v Verio Inc, 356 F (3d) 393 (2nd Cir 2004) [Register.com]; Ticketmaster Corp v
Tickets.com, Inc, 2003 WL 21406289 (CD Cal) [Ticketmaster]; Van Tassell v United Marketing Group,
LLC, 795 F Supp (2d) 770 at 790 (ND Ill 2011).
20 In re Zappos.com Inc, Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 893 F Supp (2d) 1058 at 1064 (Nev
2012) [Zappos].
21 Nguyen v Barnes & Noble, Inc, 763 F (3d) 1171 (CD Cal 2012) [Nguyen]; cf Cairo, Inc v Crossmedia
Services, Inc, 2005 WL 756610 at 2 (ND Cal), (every webpage contained a notice: “By continuing past
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predominantly enforced in cases involving business users.22 The arguments made
in many cases are, however, inconsistent23 and frequently hinge on a single design
feature—that of an additional click. US courts appear pre-occupied with categoris-
ing websites as browse-wraps or click-wraps instead of examining the intention of
each transacting party. Some decisions seem driven by the substantive unfairness of
certain terms or the need to supplement other legal regimes. Consequently, terms
may be enforced as an indirect way of recognising the right to protect databases,
which otherwise does not exist.24 Conversely, enforcement may be refused as an
indirect form of protecting consumers from unfavourable arbitration provisions.25
Other decisions have been criticised for their distortion of contract doctrine in the
name of promoting online commerce.26 In sum, the outcomes of particular cases
are frequently driven by reasons unrelated to contract law. As contract formation
is rarely distinguished from the incorporation of terms, the question of ‘intention to
create legal relations’ does not arise. Given the different legal landscape in which
‘wrap cases’ have been decided, they are of limited guidance.
II. Prerequisites of Enforceability
The question of whether contracts governing the use of websites are enforceable
necessitates a return to first principles. Three general observations are necessary.
First, references to ‘online-’ or ‘Internet contracts’ are avoided as such terminology
implies the existence of a separate legal category with its own discrete rules. Once
we assume that contract law continues to apply online we have to follow its principles
without modification. A contract formed by means of an Internet-based technology
does not become an ‘Internet contract’, just like a contract formed by an exchange of
letters does not become a ‘postal contract’. Though admittedly, the analysis gains in
complexity as the relevant principles become more difficult to apply to websites and
clicks. Second, we must not idealise traditional contracting and demonise its online
equivalent. When discussing contract law in the Internet context some scholars
seem to imply that traditional transactions reflect the ‘meeting of minds’; the parties
understand all legal consequences of their actions or that terms are negotiated. Such
implications are incorrect. Consensus ad idem and actual agreement are abstract
ideals, both offline and online. Many problems become exacerbated in the online
environment, but are not necessarily new. The enhanced communication possibilities
provided by the Internet rarely translate into actual negotiations.27 Accordingly,
this page and/or using this site, you agree to abide by the Terms of Use for this site, which prohibit
commercial use of any information on this site”).
22 Ticketmaster, supra note 19; cf Pollstar v Gigmania Ltd, 170 F Supp (2d) 974 at 982 (ED Cal 2000).
23 For a comparison of different interpretations of the same interface, see Nguyen, supra note 21 and Fteja
v Facebook, 841 F Supp (2d) 829 at 838-840.
24 ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg, 86 F (3d) 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
25 Zappos, supra note 20 at 1064.
26 Robert A Hillman, “Rolling Contracts” (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev 743; Roger C Bern, “‘Terms Later’
Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook
Notwithstanding” (2004) 12 J L & Pol’y 641; Jean Braucher, “Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-
Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice” (2000) 46 Wayne L Rev 1805.
27 Bert-Jaap Koops, “Law, Technology and Shifting Power Relations” (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech LJ 973 at
1006.
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practically all website contracts are standardised. Although standard form agree-
ments have always raised controversies regarding their consensual nature,28 they
have been routinely enforced—despite not having been read, meaningfully accepted
or even known of.29 The critique of standard form contracts must be conceptually
separated from broader problems of enforceability in the online environment. The
latter concern the fact that terms are encountered in an unfamiliar context—not the
fact that terms are imposed. Third, even the seemingly settled area of contract law
abounds in controversies. There is, for example, still no academic consensus as to
the nature or source of contractual obligations.30 The present discussion does not
join any of these debates although some of them may, indirectly, affect the analysis.
In particular, different approaches to the meaning of objectivity, including the role of
subjective intention in the formation of a contract, could tilt the argument in different
directions. Proponents of promissory theories may reach different conclusions than
supporters of transfer or reliance theories. While acknowledging the complexity of
the theoretical issues involved, space limitations prevent a more in-depth exploration
of their implications. In line with standard contractual doctrine it is assumed that
every contract requires intention and consideration, and that intention is evaluated
objectively from the perspective of a reasonable addressee.
A. Intention
Intention reflects the consensual basis of contract law. ‘Offer and acceptance’ are
conventional means by which the intention of the promisor and the intention of the
promisee are shown to coincide.31 It is often unnecessary to distinguish between
intention and the offer and acceptance analysis as the former is conceptually incorpo-
rated within the latter.32 There can be, at least theoretically, no unintentional offers
or acceptances. While the offer and acceptance analysis may sometimes appear arti-
ficial,33 it proves indispensable in many instances, such as when the exact time or
place of contact formation must be determined34 as well as when it is necessary to
infer a contract from conduct or lengthy negotiations.35 When, however, the very
existence of a contract is in question, the search is for intention in general.
28 Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate, The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2013) at 17, who calls the problem of consent in boilerplate transactions
“normative degradation”. Friedrich Kessler, “Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom
of Contract” (1943) 43 Colum L Rev 629.
29 Andrew Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract” (2005) 29 Melbourne UL Rev 179 at 197.
30 For a review of competing theories, see Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004) at 43, 106 [Smith, Contract Theory].
31 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance”
(1994) 82 Cal L Rev 1127.
32 Lee Pey Woan, “Intention to Create Legal Relations” in Andrew Phang Boon Leong, ed, The Law of
Contract in Singapore (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2012) 255 at 255.
33 See Andrew Phang JA in Gay Choon Ing, supra note 1 at paras 61-63; New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v
A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd, The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 at 167 (HL).
34 See eg, Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681 (KB), which established the ‘postal acceptance
rule’.
35 Pagnan SpA v Feed Products Ltd [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 601 (QB) at 611 (Bingham J); Tekdata
Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1209.
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1. The ‘electronic form’
Some uncertainty may, prima facie, concern the electronic form of online interac-
tions. Intention can, however, be manifested in any manner, including conduct (but
possibly excluding silence or inactivity).36 No formalities are required to conclude an
enforceable agreement. Nothing in the law of contract prohibits expressing intention
by means of websites or emails.37 Clicks, which are the main method of interacting
with websites, can produce the same legal effect as handshakes, nods or signatures.38
Continued browsing, being a deliberate act, can hardly be equated with inactivity or
silence. It must be acknowledged, however, that due to their limited expressiveness,
clicks do not belong to the same category as such culturally entrenched communica-
tive signs like handshakes, nods or signatures and are not universally perceived as
capable of producing legal consequences. Although intention can be expressed in
any manner, it will be easier to evaluate in the case of websites than in the case of
clicks. Whether a particular click constitutes an expression of legal intention and
what intention it expresses will always depend on the context in which it occurs.
And it is context, not the electronic form, which creates the first set of challenges.
2. The problem with ‘context’
When establishing the presence of an ‘intention to create legal relations’courts exam-
ine the context in which a particular interaction took place. It is presumed that
agreements made in a familial or social context are not intended to be legally bind-
ing39 whereas agreements made in a business or commercial context are intended to
be legally binding.40 Each of these presumptions is a rebuttable presumption of fact.
In both cases, however, the presumption is strong.41 Given the importance of inten-
tion, it might come as a surprise that there is virtually no case law explaining what
creates a commercial or social context. Admittedly, in the majority of circumstances
the context is obvious, so the question does not arise. Social settings usually con-
cern divorcing spouses and family disputes,42 whereas commercial settings concern
business entities questioning the legally binding character of specific statements or
documents.43 Courts focus on the relationship between the parties or on the pro-
fessional character of the interaction. It is thus inherently difficult to establish an
36 Ang Sin Hock v Khoo Eng Lim [2010] 3 SLR 179 at para 68 (CA); Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-
Boerenleenbank BA, Singapore Branch v Motorola Electronics [2011] 2 SLR 63 at para 47 (CA); HG
Beale, Chitty on Contracts, 31st ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at para 2-163 [Chitty].
37 Section 11(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act (Cap 88, 2011 Rev Ed Sing) [ETA] states that “For
the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that in the context of the formation of contracts, an offer and the
acceptance of an offer may be expressed by means of electronic communications” [emphasis added].
See also SM Integrated Transware Pte Ltd v Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2005] 2 SLR (R) 651 at para
85 (HC) (Judith Prakash J).
38 Robert A Hillman & Jeffrey J Rachlinski, “Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age” (2002)
77 NYUL Rev 429 at 481.
39 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 (CA) [Balfour].
40 Gay Choon Ing, supra note 1 at para 72.
41 Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 494 at 500 (QB) (Megaw J); Gould v Gould [1970] 1 QB 275
(CA).
42 Balfour, supra note 39; Jones v Padavatton [1969] 2 All ER 616 (CA).
43 Rose and Frank Co v J R Crompton & Bros Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261 (CA), rev’d [1925] AC 445 (HL);
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysian Mining Corporation Bhd [1989] 1 All ER 785 (CA).
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intention to create legal relations, that is, invoke one of the presumptions, when the
context is ambiguous. Such is the case in many online interactions. While web-
sites like Amazon.com are unequivocally transactional, websites like Google.com or
CNN.com are difficult to categorise. As the latter two websites are operated by pub-
lic companies aimed at generating profit, it is impossible to speak of a wholly social
context. Yet, the typical indicia of a transactional environment are missing: there is
no price indication, no virtual shopping basket, no ordering function and no input of
payment data. As the occurrence of an exchange is not immediately apparent it is dif-
ficult to describe the context as commercial and presume the existence of intention.
It must be emphasised that ‘intention to create legal relations’ can be regarded as a
formalistic precondition of enforceability or as a substantive component of the offer
and acceptance model.44 In the first instance, the question is not whether the parties
intend to be legally bound, but whether a particular agreement should be enforced.
The question is one of public policy, not reality of consent.45 Consequently, there
is no genuine inquiry into intention but only a general reluctance to interfere with
family and social arrangements.46 Such inquiry occurs in the second instance, when
intention is analysed within the offer and acceptance model. It is only then that the
objective theory of contract enters the analysis and the courts inquire as to what was
intended. In both instances, however, the role of context must be appreciated; in
the first instance, it serves to determine the existence of intention, in the second, it
determines the meaning of statements.47
B. Consideration
The difficulty of establishing legal intention is largely attributable to the ambiguity
of the context of most online interactions. This ambiguity is, in turn, related to the
new type of transaction; in return for access to content and services, users permit
the collection and utilisation of their personal information. This leads to the sec-
ond prerequisite of enforceability: consideration.48 Consideration, often described
as ‘something provided in exchange’, is a legal construct invented to distinguish
between those promises which are enforceable from those which are not. Consid-
eration need not be adequate, only sufficient in the eyes of the law.49 One party
suffers a detriment or the other obtains a benefit. The focus is on reciprocity, not on
44 Edwin Peel, ed, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 12th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at para
1-008 [Treitel]. See also Gerard McMeel, “Contractual Intention: The Smoke Ball Strikes Back”
(1997) 113 Law Q Rev 47 at 49: “[M]ost of the cases which explicitly discuss ‘intent to create legal
relations’ have nothing to do with contractual intention. Rather they concern the exclusion from the
contractual adjudication process of disputes for which the (mainly commercial) doctrines of contract
law are inappropriate.”
45 Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Consideration and Serious Intention” (2009) Sing JLS 434 at 444 [Chen-Wishart
(2009)].
46 Stephen Hadley, “Keeping Contract in its Place—Balfour v Balfour and the Enforceability of Informal
Agreements” (1985) 5 Oxford J Leg Stud 391.
47 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 (HL); in Singa-
pore, the contextual approach to the interpretation of contracts has been affirmed in Zurich Insurance
(Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR (R) 1029 (CA).
48 Gay Choon Ing, supra note 1 at para 64.
49 Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd [1960] AC 87 (HL).
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equivalence of value. Prima facie, these principles seem easily transposable to an
online environment; users benefit by accessing websites, operators benefit by col-
lecting user information.50 Alternatively, it can be said that users suffer a detriment
by surrendering their information. The frequent references to ‘free’ online content
or services are misleading as they incorrectly imply that no consideration is required
or that no exchange is taking place.
Despite the prevalent practice of paying for goods and services, there is no require-
ment in contract law that one party must provide consideration in the form of money.
Just as clicks can express intention, information can constitute consideration. We
could proceed with our analysis, having accepted the relative ease of finding consider-
ation in website contracts. Such conclusion is, unfortunately, premature. Although
textbooks on contract law analyse consideration and intention separately, the two
concepts are inherently interwoven.51 It has been suggested that intention, offer,
acceptance and consideration are not distinct constituents of a contract, but merely
different ways of looking at the same thing.52 It is also generally accepted that if
intention is present, the finding of consideration will not be problematic,53 especially
in commercial transactions.54 The close relationship between intention and consid-
eration has even led to theories that one can be substituted for the other or that there is
no need for both.55 Consequently, any difficulties in establishing intention may affect
the presence of consideration. Although the question whether consideration should
be provided intentionally is never posed, any inquiry into consideration assumes the
presence of a promise, which by definition must be intentional.56 In executory con-
tracts, the mutual promises constitute consideration for each other.57 Theories that
question the separate requirements of intention and consideration assume that when
one is present, so is the other. In particular, it is emphasised that the presence of a bar-
gain may render superfluous any additional proof of intention and consideration.58
As consideration is inherently tied to the concept of reciprocity,59 its existence may
50 Diane Rowland, Ute Kohl & Andrew Charlesworth, Information Technology Law, 4th ed (London:
Routledge, 2012) at 254; for a description of various revenue models based on user information see
Dave Chaffey, Digital Business and E-Commerce Management, 6th ed (London: Pearson, 2015) at 58.
51 Historically, consideration was regarded as proof of intention: see Pillans v Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr
1663; J Unger, “Intent to Create Legal Relations, Mutuality and Consideration” (1956) 19 Mod L Rev
96.
52 Michael Furmston, ed, Butterworths Common Law Series, The Law of Contract, 4th ed (London:
LexisNexis, 2010) at paras 2.4, 2.6.
53 The Aramis [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213 at 225 (CA) (Bingham LJ); Tilson v Alstom Transport [2010]
EWCA Civ 1308; Ajar-Tec Ltd v Stack [2012] EWCA Civ 543; Warren Swain, “Contract as Promise:
The Role of Promising in the Law of Contract. An Historical Account” (2013) 17 Ed L Rev 1 at 19, 20.
54 Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 1 SLR 853 at para 29 (HC).
55 CJ Hamson “The Reform of Consideration” (1938) 54 Law Q Rev 233; Unger, supra note 51; White
v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 at 262 (HL) (Lord Goff); Andrew Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obli-
gations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) at 197; Gay Choon
Ing, supra note 1 at para 92; see also Andrew Boon Leong Phang, “Consideration at the Crossroads”
(1991) 107 Law Q Rev 21; cf Chen-Wishart (2009), supra note 45.
56 Brian Coote, Contract as Assumption: Essays on a Theme (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 25;
originally published in Brian Coote, “The Essence of Contract” (1988) 3 Journal of Contract Law
91-112, 183-204.
57 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at para 139.
58 BA Hepple, “Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1970) 28 Cambridge LJ 122 at 127, 128.
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be problematic if the bargain aspect of an interaction is unclear. A recent English
case emphasised that consideration need not be the output of a conscious thought
process. The court stated, however, that when the detriment is suffered there must be
a belief that something will be received in return.60 There must be an understanding
that an exchange is taking place. Such understanding is, however, generally absent
when users conduct a Google search or visit news websites. Users are not transacting
but ‘just Googling something’ or ‘browsing the news’. Most users remain oblivious
to the fact that they are benefiting from sophisticated technologies, or content, that
took years to develop and cost millions of dollars to maintain.61 Most users also
do not realise that they are paying with their information. This lack of transactional
awareness is attributable to the popular assumption that online resources are ‘free’, ie
access is unrestricted and gratuitous. The technical accessibility of website content
and services is equated with an absence of usage limitations and the need for reci-
procity. The perception of unrestricted availability may derive from the very source
of the web’s popularity: its ease of use and informal character. This perception is
further reinforced by the lack of monetary payment. The indication of a price has,
after all, a signalling function. Historically, most of the information on the web
was available without charge or contractual restrictions. For a long time, the web
has been synonymous with free expression, openness and peer production, not with
commercial exploitation. Unsurprisingly, most users do not perceive their online
interactions as transactions. They would contend that because online resources are
free, there is no need to provide something in return. As there is no exchange, there
is no legal intention and therefore no contract. It is, however, questionable whether
the enforceability of a contract can hinge solely on a purported lack of transac-
tional awareness, which in turn relies on popular perception. We must proceed to
a discussion of the objective theory of contract, with a particular emphasis on the
reasonableness of the user and his expectations.
III. An Objective Evaluation of Intention
As the requirement of intention reflects the philosophical underpinnings of contract
law, particularly its focus on autonomy and self-determination, the very notion of
unintended contracts seems untenable. The practical reality, however, differs. Con-
tract law relies on appearances; identifying the circumstances in which the parties are
regarded as having reached agreement.62 Commercial certainty requires a detach-
ment from the actual subjective state of mind of individual participants. Intention
is evaluated objectively, from the perspective of a reasonable addressee.63 Alterna-
tively, it can be said that a statement is construed “in the sense in which it would
60 Pitts v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301 at para 18.
61 For example, Google’s research and development expenses in 2015 amounted to US$12.282 billion, as
of 31 December 2015, source: Bloomberg LP.
62 Gay Choon Ing, supra note 1 at para 56; Richard Craswell, “Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance”
(1996) 48 Stan L Rev 481 at 482.
63 PaalWilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1AC 854 at 915 (HL) (Lord Diplock);
see also JM Perillo, “The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation”
(2000) 69 Fordham L Rev 427; Phang & Goh speak of “promisee objectivity” in Andrew Phang Boon
Leong & Goh Yihan, “Offer and Acceptance” in Andrew Phang Boon Leong, ed, The Law of Contract
in Singapore (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2012), at paras 03.012, 03.013 [Phang & Goh].
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reasonably be understood” by its addressee.64 By judging intention from words and
behaviour, the objective approach protects the reliance and expectations of those to
whom such words and behaviour are directed.65 Driven to its extreme, the need to
protect reliance may trump the need for consent66 or even the basic premise that
contractual obligations are voluntarily assumed.67 It is acknowledged that contracts
can be formed against the wishes of one of the parties, the price of certainty being
measured “in terms of the small number of parties who find themselves bound to
transactions which they did not intend.”68 If it is only appearances of intention that
matter, then our previous concerns regarding the presence of contractual intention
may seem of limited relevance. Some questions arise though. What if the number
of such ‘unintended transactions’ is not small? What if most Internet users do not
intend to contract when accessing websites? More importantly, which of the parties,
the user or the operator, seems more deserving of the protection of the objective
theory of contract? We must also remember that, as emphasised in Digilandmall,
the objective theory of contract cannot assist an addressee of a statement if he knew
that it does not represent the true intention of its maker.69 In other words, despite
objective appearances, the maker of a statement will not be bound if the addressee
knows that the maker does not subjectively intend to be bound.70 The objective the-
ory of contract is overridden not so much by subjective intention but by knowledge
of subjective intention. In the present discussion, the operators’ intention is beyond
doubt. They want to contract on the terms provided by the legal link and harvest user
information in return for the right to use the content and/or services made available
on their websites. Most users, however, will deny any contractual intent—or even
any awareness that a transaction is taking place.
A. Reliance on Appearances
Both the statements of the user and the statements of the operator must be evalu-
ated objectively. The first complications concern certain assumptions underpinning
the objective theory of contract. The latter protects persons reasonably relying on
appearances, not persons creating appearances. It assumes, however, that each
person controls and is therefore responsible for the statements (ie appearances) he
makes. The straightforward distinction between those who create and those who
64 Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2002] 2 SLR (R) 407 at para 40 (CA) [Tribune
Investment].
65 Robertson, supra note 29 at 203; Coote, supra note 56 at 22.
66 Randy E Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract” (1986) 86 Colum L Rev 269 at 306.
67 Robertson, supra note 29 at 204.
68 William Howarth, “A Note on the Objective of Objectivity in Contract” (1987) 103 Law Q Rev 527 at
531.
69 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at para 105; see also Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers in Shogun Finance
Ltd v Hudson [2003] 3 WLR 1371 at para 123 (HL), referring to Hartog v Colin & Shields [1939] 3
All ER 566; Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at 610. See also Aircharter World Pte Ltd v Kontena
Nasional Bhd [1999] 2 SLR (R) 440 at para 30 (CA); Projection Pte Ltd v The Tai Ping Insurance Co
Ltd [2001] 1 SLR (R) 798 at para 15 (CA).
70 Treitel, supra note 44 at para 02-003; JPVorster, “AComment on the Meaning of Objectivity in Contract”
(1987) 103 Law Q Rev 274 at 287; JR Spencer, “Signature, Consent, and the Rule in L’Estrange v
Graucob” (1973) 32 Cambridge LJ 104 at 106, 107; PS Atiyah, “The Hannah Blumenthal and Classical
Contract Law” (1986) 102 Law Q Rev 363 at 364.
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rely on appearances often collapses in online transactions. The operator’s statement
takes the form of his website. The user makes a statement by browsing the website.
Arguably, however, the appearances are created by operators, not by users. It can
be stated, without much exaggeration, that operators design both their statements
and—to a large extent—those of the users. Operators create the content, structure,
sequence and permissible range of interactions on websites. User input is limited to
activating hyperlinks, checking boxes and, sometimes, filling out fields. The form
and contents of statements ‘made by’ users are predetermined by operators. Users
respond to websites in a controlled manner, with little room for personalised input.
The statements of a user can only ‘mirror’ the statements of the operator, the meaning
of a click only derive from the context created by the website. No intention to create
legal relations can be inferred from the user’s actions if no such intention is apparent
from the website. It seems artificial to regard the operator as the ‘addressee’of a user’s
statement if he dictates its content and the context in which it is made. The original
function of the objective theory of contract, ie protecting reliance on a statement,
loses its justification.71 Consequently, although in the majority of circumstances it
is the user’s intention that is in question, the analysis should focus not on the state-
ment of the user but on that of the operator: the website itself. Does the website
indicate that the operator intends to be legally bound? Is it objectively apparent that
a transaction is taking place or does the website create an appearance of unrestricted
availability of its content? To reiterate: references to commercial certainty based
on protecting the addressee’s reliance must be approached with caution as it may
be the addressee who controls—or at least largely predetermines—the statements
he receives. The analysis would be simplified if it was possible to establish that a
particular website constituted an offer, that is, evinced the operator’s intention to be
bound by a simple ‘yes.’ The user’s actions, including continued browsing, could be
interpreted as an acceptance. The separate inquiry into the presence of contractual
intention would be superfluous. Problems of consideration would not arise because
acceptance would constitute a counter-promise. It is, however, generally difficult to
determine whether a particular website constitutes an offer or only an invitation to
treat. The existence of an offer depends on the contents of a statement, not on its
form. Although the interpretation of certain kinds of expressions appears standard-
ised,72 care must be taken not to generalise. Many websites can be compared to shop
displays, mail-order catalogues or to traditional advertising,73 each of which is rou-
tinely regarded as a non-binding invitation to treat. The fact that a given website can
be subsumed under either category does not, however, preclude it from being binding
as both advertisements and shop displays can constitute offers if they are sufficiently
71 Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification, 2d ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at para 3.09 [McMeel, Construction of Contracts].
72 Eisenberg, supra note 31 at 1129; Treitel, supra note 44 at para 2-007.
73 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1953] 1 QB 401 at
407 (CA); Lacis v Cashmarts [1969] 2 QB 400 (Divisional Court). See also ETA, supra note 37, s
14, which establishes the default rule that a proposal to conclude a contract made through electronic
communications which is not addressed to one or more specific parties but is generally accessible to
parties making use of information systems (including proposals that make use of interactive applications
for the placement of orders through such systems) is deemed to be an invitation to make offers, unless
it clearly indicates the intention of the party making the proposal to be bound in case of acceptance.
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certain and complete to allow the inference of intention.74 Given the automation of
the interaction and the restricted range of user input, many websites are comparable
to vending machines. The latter are generally regarded as offers.75 The resemblance
to vending machines is particularly strong when the performance of the contract, ie
the delivery of digital content or services, occurs online. In such instance, the protec-
tive function of invitations is not required as the risk of over-acceptance is generally
absent. It could be argued that websites like Google or CNN.com constitute offers.
The completeness of their contents evinces an intention to be bound. The contractual
subject matter is certain: search services and the provision of news, respectively. In
the case of Google, users select the search term, in the case of CNN.com, users select
the content of interest. Nothing else needs to or can be added. The transaction is
immediately executed. From a strictly legal perspective, the contents and certainty
of many websites indicate an intention to be bound. Still, from the perspective of the
average user, an analysis in terms of offers and invitations may seem more natural in
the case of websites selling books, tickets or hotel rooms. In this sense, the existence
of an offer may be as difficult to determine as the presence of a commercial context.
It is worth noting that the binding character of websites is often expressly excluded
in the terms of use, leading to a situation where the offer is made by the user and
the operator’s acceptance takes the form of the actual provision of the service or
content. As the contents of most statements are dictated or controlled by operators,
no substantive difference flows from this reversal of roles.
B. The User’s Perspective
It must be conceded that operators cannot rely on self-created appearances. The fact
that operators control the online interaction does not, however, absolve users from
exercising a certain amount of diligence when browsing the web. We must remember
that the objective theory protects only reasonable addressees—and the user is, after
all, an addressee of the operator’s statement, ie the website. We must also remember
that users access websites for specific purposes and are presented with certain con-
tent. If we regard the user as a reasonable addressee of the operator’s statement, we
must analyse his intention from multiple angles. The discussion must include three
interrelated factors: (a) the indispensable level of understanding of one’s actions; (b)
the omnipresence of ‘legal links’; and (c) the ‘reasonableness’ of user expectations.
Although presented under separate headings, all converge on the question: “Under
what circumstances is the user able to successfully claim that he had no intention to
be legally bound?” Alternatively, the question can be phrased as: “When should a
click, or continued browsing, be regarded as an expression of intention?”
1. Intention and ‘Understanding’
Arguably, legal intention presupposes a certain level of understanding of the impli-
cations of one’s actions. The fact that an act was intentional does not, however,
74 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at para 94; Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 at 262 (CA);
Parker v Clark [1960] 1 All ER 93; Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 NW (2d) 689
(Minn 1957); Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225 (HL).
75 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 at 169 (CA) [Thornton].
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mean that its legal consequences were intended.76 This distinction becomes relevant
when a single click can create a contractual relationship and when the very exis-
tence of a contract could hinge on the user’s contention that he did not intend any
consequences. We must inquire about the minimal threshold of intention that can
sustain an enforceable agreement, objective theory notwithstanding. What exactly
must be intended? As contractual obligations must be voluntarily assumed,77 inten-
tion cannot be separated from the concept of voluntariness, which, in turn, implies
an understanding of what one is doing. Although the problem exists in simultane-
ous exchanges, it seems more pertinent to executory contracts, where the parties’
obligations are to be performed over an extended period of time. Unsurprisingly,
academic views diverge as to the indispensable degree of understanding. Robertson,
who discusses voluntariness predominantly in the context of standardised contracts,
contends that an obligation can only be regarded as voluntarily assumed if it is “mean-
ingfully understood”.78 Coote, whose theory on the nature of contractual obligations
rests upon the very concept of ‘assumption’, emphasises that the parties need not
“turn their minds beforehand to every incident of the intended relationship.” It is
possible to intend an act the full legal consequences of which are unknown.79 Chen-
Wishart, who analyses intention in the context of mistake,80 states that the conduct
purportedly constituting consent must be intentional, accompanied by knowledge
that it will count as contracting and a “minimum threshold of accuracy as to the gist
of the contract.”81 If one has made a fundamental mistake as to the very nature
of the obligation undertaken, the consent is not sufficiently meaningful to justify
enforceability.82 While this approach does not require a thorough comprehension
of the obligation being undertaken, it requires that a person knows that he is assum-
ing some obligation. Similarly, Smith states that one can misunderstand the content
of an obligation but not the fact of undertaking an obligation.83 The latter two
approaches reflect the view that contracts cannot be entered into by mistake and that
actual, subjective intention matters when establishing the existence of a contract. To
date, however, these views have found limited support.84 The relationship between
contractual intention and the indispensable level of understanding of one’s actions
could be discussed ad infinitum. Different conclusions will be reached depending
on whether we insist on the presence of subjective intention (which is an isolated
view) and whether we lean towards reliance or towards promissory theories. In prin-
ciple, parties are bound by their outward behaviour.85 From a practical perspective,
76 For a detailed discussion see: Elizabeth MacDonald, “When is a Contract Formed by the Browse-wrap
Process?” (2011) 19 Intl JL & IT 285 at 300.
77 Chitty, supra note 36 at paras 1-027-1-029; Burrows, supra note 55 at 13; Coote, supra note 56 at 43,
45, 50; Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981).
78 Robertson, supra note 29 at 181.
79 Coote, supra note 56 at 45.
80 Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Contractual Mistake, Intention in Formation and Vitiation: the Oxymoron of
Smith v Hughes” in Jason W Neyers, Richard Bronaugh & Stephen GA Pitel, eds, Exploring Contract
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) at 341.
81 Ibid at 365.
82 Ibid.
83 Smith, Contract Theory, supra note 30 at 61.
84 Ibid for a detailed discussion at 61, 173, 174.
85 McMeel, Construction of Contracts, supra note 71 at para 3.13.
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assuming that one of the main functions of contract law is to facilitate exchanges or
enable bargains, an intention to be legally bound must at least encompass an inten-
tion to transact.86 While not all potential legal consequences of an act need to be
contemplated, an understanding or awareness that an exchange is taking place must
be regarded as indispensable. Anything more would impose an unrealistic threshold,
which is not reflected in commercial practice. Anything less would contradict the
basic principle that contractual obligations are assumed. Taking everyday commer-
cial practice as a point of reference, it becomes apparent that contract law does not
require that parties intend the legal consequences of their actions. Mapping abstract
legal principles onto actual behaviour is artificial and difficult. Contract law looks
at outward appearances and, post factum, places certain labels on certain acts. If
the parties seem to engage in transacting behaviour then contract law will infer that
both parties had the requisite legal intention. A person purchasing a coffee does
not understand that the exchange of money for the beverage creates an enforceable
agreement. A contract is formed despite such indifference to or absence of legal
intention. It seems to suffice that the person intends to buy a coffee; ie the act that
will give rise to legal consequences, not the consequences themselves. As long as
a person intends to transact, establishing the presence of legal intention should not
be a problem. It is, however, overly simplistic to state that it suffices to intend to
click without realising the possible legal implications. Instead, we should disregard
the click (and its deceiving simplicity) and focus on the fact that the user intends to
benefit from the website resources. In this context, is the user’s purported lack of
transactional awareness justified in light of what he sees on the website?
2. The ‘Legal Link’
This stage of our analysis requires an examination of the website content. All popu-
lar websites conventionally display a hyperlink in their lower portions, which, upon
activation, displays the terms of the transaction (the aforementioned ‘legal link’).
The nearly pervasive presence of legal links forces us to inquire about their sig-
nificance. This in turn requires an analysis of the process of incorporating terms.
Formation and incorporation are discrete concepts; formation concerns the existence
of a contract, incorporation concerns the contents of an existing contract. Problems
of incorporation are relevant for two reasons. First, in some instances, successful
incorporation may affect formation, ie the formation of a contract may depend on
the communication of terms. Such is the case when terms prescribe the manner of
expressing intention or acceptance, eg, “by staying on the site you agree to be bound
by our terms.”87 Technically, if the terms have not been communicated, the other
party does not know how to assent. Analysed in terms of offer and acceptance, an
offeror is the master of the offer and dictates the manner of acceptance. As the offer
can only be accepted in the prescribed manner, acceptance requires knowledge of the
offer.88 Second, enforceability requires certainty and completeness. An agreement
that is not sufficiently certain is presumed not to be intended to be legally binding.89
86 Coote, supra note 56 at 39.
87 See eg, Register.com, supra note 19.
88 Phang & Goh, supra note 63 at para 03.138.
89 Gay Choon Ing, supra note 1 at para 47.
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Terms describe the transaction: what rights are granted by operators to users and
what rights are granted by users to operators. In many instances, without the terms,
the agreement would fail for want of certainty and completeness as it may be difficult
to imply terms in fact or find suitable statutory provisions due to the new type of
transactional subject matter. In sum, while the enforceability of contracts governing
the use of websites presents a broader problem than the question whether the terms
behind a ‘legal link’ have become incorporated, the two issues overlap. Logically,
assent to the terms indicates assent to the contract.90
All methods of incorporation require that terms be communicated before the act
concluding contract formation. But, the party seeking to incorporate terms need
not (a) impart actual knowledge of their content or force the other party to read
them, (b) physically provide the terms or ensure their immediate availability. It is
their existence, not their contents that must be communicated. Once the other party
knows of the terms, it is her choice to request and read them. In cases concerning
incorporation by signature, the signatory is bound, regardless whether he has read
the document.91 Despite the broad understanding of the term ‘signature’, most cases
deal with handwritten signatures on documents that are evidently contractual. We
need not, however, debate what constitutes a signature in online transactions.92 The
point is that signatures, whether traditional or electronic, incorporate terms only if
placed on a contractual document. The legal effect of a signature derives from the
nature of the document being signed and from the intention with which it is made.
Consequently, if signatures cannot incorporate terms if not placed on contractual
documents, then clicks cannot express contractual intention if made on websites that
do not appear transactional. Of particular importance to our problem is incorpora-
tion by notice. For terms to become incorporated, notice of their existence must
be reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.93 Although incorporation
concerns terms in general, more notice is required with regards to onerous or unusual
terms.94 It is also acknowledged that it may not be reasonable to expect terms on
certain types of documents.95 Lastly, as it may be impracticable to provide terms in
the contractual document or at the time of transacting, incorporation can occur by
reference to other documents or locations.96 To date, courts have tolerated references
to terms available in remote locations, recognising the difficulties of providing or
90 The possibility of applying legal analysis pertaining to the incorporation of terms to the formation
of a contract has been expressly recognised in Century 21 Canada Limited Partnership v Rogers
Communications Inc, 2011 BCSC 1196, 338 DLR (4th) 32 [Century 21].
91 L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394; McCutcheon v David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR
125 at 134 (HL) (Lord Devlin).
92 See Joseph Mathew v Singh Chiranjeev [2010] 1 SLR 338 (CA) for a discussion on whether the require-
ments of s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed Sing) can be fulfilled by electronic means
of communication; MacDonald, supra note 76 at 198.
93 Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council [1940] 1 KB 532 (CA); Hood v Anchor Line [1918] AC 837
at 844 (HL) [Hood].
94 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v StilettoVisual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433 (CA); Spurling v Bradshaw
[1956] 2 All ER 121 (CA).
95 Hood, supra note 93; Parker v The South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416 (CA) [South Eastern
Railway].
96 OK Petroleum AB v Vitol Energy SA [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 160 (QB); Hong Kong Borneo Services Co
Ltd v Pilcher [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 593 (QB).
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reading terms at the point of sale, eg, in parking lots,97 ferry terminals98 or railway
stations.99 Incorporation procedures have been tailored to the practical constraints of
traditional transacting environments. Online, however, these constraints disappear;
the legal link provides a direct reference and ensures that terms remain available
throughout the interaction. More importantly, the link is visible from the moment
the user enters the website. For present purposes, the Google website can be regarded
as a test example. It provides a minimalist interface: a search bar and a number of
links, including one labelled ‘Terms’, against a white background. Google’s website
ranks very low in complexity of content and structure but high in usability and com-
munication effectiveness.100 Many websites are on the other end of the extreme; the
interface is cluttered and the discovery of terms involves a sequence of non-intuitive
steps. The cognitive distortions inherent in artificial interfaces may be aggravated
by distracting or malicious design.101 While acknowledging the multitude of pos-
sible configurations (and the accompanying range of legal problems), it is useful to
simplify the analysis with the following assumptions: (a) the link remains visible
in lower part of the screen and displays the terms upon its activation; and (b) its
wording is unambiguous, eg, ‘Terms of Use’ or ‘Legal Terms’. Both assumptions
reflect prevalent practice. It is also assumed that every user understands that “more
information is available by clicking on a blue hyperlink”102 and that on the smaller
screens of mobile devices the legal link features more prominently. The question
remains: how does the visibility of the link and the availability of terms affect the
user’s argument that he did not have any legal intention? It is possible to build
opposing arguments.
The first argument contends that the legal link does not signal the occurrence of
a transaction or that continued browsing is subject to contract. An intention to be
legally bound, on the side of either the operator or the user, cannot be inferred from its
presence. While it is reasonable to expect terms when a transaction is taking place, it
is not necessarily reasonable to conclude that a transaction is taking place whenever
terms are present. Notice of terms constitutes a prerequisite of incorporation when
the fact of contracting is beyond doubt. Moreover, the availability of terms does
not solve the problem of intention. Intention is predominantly a product of context
not information.103 Absent transactional awareness, users will not understand the
relevance of the link. The first argument attributes no significance to its persistent
visibility and to the fact that terms can be read at the user’s convenience. It accepts
the user’s contention: “I saw the link but I disregarded it because I thought it was
irrelevant.” The second argument centres on the visibility of the legal link and the
ease with which a user can inform itself as to its relevance, ie retrieve its contents. It
is conceded that according to the principles of contract law it is the type of document
or the transactional context that create an expectation of terms—not the other way
97 Thornton, supra note 75.
98 Hollingworth v Southern Ferries Ltd (The “Eagle”) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70 (QB); The Balmain New
Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379 (HCA).
99 South Eastern Railway, supra note 95.
100 Robert Mai et al, “The Shifting Range of Optimal Web Site Complexity” (2014) 28 Journal of Interactive
Marketing 101.
101 Woodrow Hartzog, “Website Design as Contract” (2011) 60 Am U L Rev 1635 at 1688.
102 Hubbert v Dell Corporation, 835 NE (2d) 113 at 121 (Ill App Ct 2005).
103 Omri Ben-Shahar, “Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia” (2014) 112 Mich L Rev 883 at 891.
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around. It can be argued, however, that expectations become irrelevant when the
presence of terms is not in question. If the website displays terms, it is reasonable to
assume that they are somehow relevant, eg, that continued use of the website might
be subject to contract. The user’s contention that he disregarded the link because he
did not comprehend its legal significance is rejected. The user makes a deliberate
decision not to inform herself and thus assumes the risk of any adverse consequences.
The latter are easily prevented by minimal inquisitiveness. The second argument
assumes that the legal link puts a user on notice. The effortlessness with which terms
can be reviewed compensates for any residual doubts a user might have as to their
relevance. Even Radin, an ardent opponent of standard terms, acknowledges that if
the user knows (or should know) about the terms and proceeds within the site, such
action objectively indicates their acceptance.104 To clarify: the second argument
does not contend that the mere presence of terms ensures their enforceability. It
only contends that legal links are omnipresent and that it may be difficult to deny
knowledge of their existence, especially with repeated use of one website or similar
websites. The pervasiveness of a practice does not determine its legal effect. It
may, however, as a matter of fact preclude the claim that one was unaware of the
practice. The main weakness of the first argument lies in that it denies that the
presence of terms has any legal implications and, effectively, absolves the user from
any inquisitiveness; the main weakness of the second argument lies in the inference
of contractual intention from the mere notice of terms.
Neither argument can in itself determine the outcome of the discussion. Both
converge on the question whether the link constitutes sufficient notice of the legal
consequences attached to the continued use of the website; that is: whether the user
can deny any transactional awareness while knowing of the existence of the legal link.
It is uncontroversial that notice must be reasonable in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances and that enhanced notice requirements accompany particularly onerous
provisions. It could be argued that the ambiguous context of many online interac-
tions requires that users be specifically notified that proceeding within the website is
subject to contract. The less clear the transactional context, the more notice would
be required. As is pointed out by MacDonald: what constitutes reasonable notice for
the purposes of incorporation may not suffice for the purposes of formation.105 Some
support for an enhanced notice, ie the introduction of an additional element apart
from the legal link, can also be derived from contract law, albeit through an indirect
route. The absence of transactional awareness is largely attributable to the lack of
monetary consideration. Payment, as opposed to a passive acquiescence to the col-
lection of one’s information, signals that an exchange is taking place. Consideration
itself is often regarded as performing the same cautionary function as formalities. It
is argued that formality could replace consideration,106 or that nominal considera-
tion could be regarded as a formality indicating legal intention if the presence of a
bargain was otherwise unclear.107 Coote observed that consideration has supplanted
104 Margaret Jane Radin, “Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine” (2002) 70
Fordham L Rev 1125 at 1126.
105 MacDonald, supra note 76 at 295, 300.
106 Swain, supra note 53 at 4.
107 Chen-Wishart (2009), supra note 45 at 438; see also Merritt v Merritt [1970] 2All ER 760 (CA); Haggar
v De Placido [1972] 2 All ER 1029 (QB).
88 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2016]
form or other “ceremonies” as a way of differentiating contract formation from other
actions.108 The informal character of online interactions could thus be interpreted
as increasing the need for signals and ceremonies. The point is not, however, to add
nominal consideration, as consideration is already present, or re-introduce formal-
ities into contract law. The point is to alert users that an exchange is taking place.
Enhanced notice would thus replicate the cautionary, or ‘ceremonial’, function of
consideration.109 The problem with the proposition, however, is that creates a princi-
ple specific to Internet transactions. This contradicts the legal position in Singapore.
It was “axiomatic” that normal contractual principles continue to apply online.110
The Digilandmall Court acknowledged, however, that “not all principles will or can
apply in the same manner that they apply to traditional paper-based and oral con-
tracts.”111 Arguably, we are not introducing a new principle but only changing the
application of an existing one or adapting the concept of ‘reasonableness’ to the new
circumstances. Neither approach, however, ensures legal certainty. The difference
between creating new rules and applying old rules differently is elusive. It is also
unclear which principles can be applied differently and which are immutable. An
additional difficulty lies in defining ‘online transactions’. What would be the primary
criterion of differentiation: the manner of communication or the novel contractual
subject matter? These questions alone require careful analysis. Lastly, it is unclear
what form enhanced notice should take. There are few technical options: pop-up
windows, interstitial webpages or persistent page elements resembling cookie noti-
fication bars, popular in EU jurisdictions. All of them would require users to (at least
briefly) view whatever text is presented on them and require some action to pro-
ceed within the website, effectively creating a regime resembling US ‘click-wrap’
agreements. The introduction of enhanced notice requirements can only be debated
on the assumption that the legal link does not constitute a reasonable notice that a
transaction is taking place or alert a reasonable user that the continued use of the
website is subject to contract. It will always remain controversial what constitutes
reasonable notice and what standard of behaviour is expected from the reasonable
user. To a large extent both factors will depend on his expectations.
3. Reasonable Expectations
It is uncontroversial that the objective theory protects reasonable addressees. It is
equally uncontroversial that the law only protects the “reasonable expectations of
honest men”.112 Without indulging in unnecessary semantics, it can be assumed that
‘reasonable expectations’correlate, to a large extent, with the knowledge that must be
possessed by a reasonable Internet user and, ultimately, affect his ability to claim that
he had no legal intention or, at least, no transactional awareness. When establishing
108 Coote, supra note 56 at 41.
109 Juliet M Moringiello, “Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting” (2005) 57 Rutgers L Rev 1307 at 1316.
110 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at para 102.
111 Ibid at para 91.
112 Lord Steyn in Johan Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men”
(1997) 113 Law Q Rev 433 at 434; G Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
25 at 27 (CA); Yong Pung How CJ in Tribune Investment, supra note 64 at para 40: “[T]he function
of the court is to try as far as practical experience allows, to ensure that the reasonable expectations of
honest men are not disappointed” [my emphasis].
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what expectations are reasonable, the main difficulty lies in mapping the assumptions
and knowledge based on our real life experiences onto the online environment. Users
are expected to know that digital content, such as movies or music, is protected by
copyright and must not be downloaded illegally. Are they, however, expected to know
that website content and services are expensive to create and, accordingly, expect
to pay for their use? Or are they permitted to claim ignorance of these facts and,
again, rely on a purported lack of transactional awareness despite the unquestionable
presence of legal terms? In a recent case concerning the enforceability of website
contracts, Justice R Punnett stated:
The manner in which the web has developed with freely available access may
differentiate a user’s expectations of the web from the user of a service such
as a bus, train or aircraft. While the expectation of a user may be that access is
free and without restrictions, the Internet and its use is an evolving entity. As
such, expectations change as does the sophistication of the user. In addition,
it is not the users’ expectation that is determinative. What they assume to be
the case does not take precedence over the existence of an offer, notice of that
offer and the act of acceptance. An erroneous expectation, even with legal
advice, does not prevail.113
It must be conceded that many websites do not appear unequivocally transactional.
Arguably then, the legal link may not constitute sufficient notice that continued
browsing is subject to contract. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that
users access websites for a specific purpose: to use the content and services made
available thereon. When discussing the minimal understanding of the legal implica-
tions of one’s actions, it was tentatively established that users must at the very least
comprehend that an exchange is taking place. While we may question the user’s
legal intention to enter into a contract, we cannot question the reason he accesses
websites. The act of browsing must be seen as a means to an end; to obtain a benefit.
Is it, however, reasonable to expect that services or content can be used without
giving anything in return? The user’s denial of contractual intention rests on his
purported lack of transactional awareness. The latter is, however, attributable to his
expectations that website resources are ‘free’ and unrestricted. As indicated, part of
the problem in establishing reasonable expectation lies in the difficulty of transposing
offline expectations onto the online environment. Arguably, it is reasonable to expect
that if an activity is not governed by contract offline then it should not be governed
by contract online. This argument, however, relies on the untested assumption that
each online activity has an offline equivalent that is ‘contract free’. It also disregards
the presence of intermediating technologies.114 Websites are accessed to shop, bank,
work, watch movies, listen to music or socialise. Some of these activities resem-
ble or supplement existing practices; others have no real-world equivalent. Caution
must be exercised when comparing an online activity to its purported offline coun-
terpart. If there is nothing to compare it to, it becomes difficult to argue that some
activity was, until the emergence of the web, free of contract. There may not be
any similar activity. We continue to meet friends for lunch and gossip in hallways.
113 Century 21, supra note 90 at para 77.
114 Hartzog, supra note 101 at 1650.
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In both instances our interactions are not governed by contract. The Internet does not
change anything in this regard. We do, however, also use novel technologies for our
social and professional interactions as well as for our entertainment needs. The fact
that real life social interactions do not require a contract is irrelevant if Facebook
and Twitter are qualitatively different and involve the use of third party services
and a multitude of technologies. Similarly, we have always been contracting to buy
newspapers, music and movie tickets. Contractual relationships have accompanied
the consumption of most media. Why then, should users not expect to contract for
identical content if it is delivered online?
C. A Detour into Unilateral Mistake
A user may claim that he was mistaken as to the fact that his continued use of the
website would result in a contract. Cases on unilateral mistake traditionally con-
cern the contractual subject matter, the terms of the transaction or the identity of the
other party115—not the fact of entering into a contract. Unilateral mistake is also
frequently discussed as part of the offer and acceptance model,116 with the mistaken
assumption or manifestation of intention effectively preventing consensus ad idem.
While the role of subjective intention in contract formation remains controversial,
the role of knowledge of subjective intention is relatively clear.117 For present pur-
poses, it is worthwhile to revisit the reasoning in Digilandmall. Although the case
concerns a mistake as to terms, not a mistake as to the fact of contracting, it explores
the interrelationship between the objective theory of contract and the knowledge that
must be imputed to a reasonable Internet user. This knowledge in turn assists in
evaluating the reasonableness of the user—and his expectations. The case empha-
sises the necessity to analyse not only the statement but also the state of mind of
its addressee; ie the party seeking the protection of the objective theory. Digiland-
mall concerned the display of incorrect, absurdly low prices on a website selling
electronic equipment. The incorrect pricing was due to the error of an employee
who uploaded a training template to a live website. Unsurprisingly, many orders
were placed for a specific type of printer, which was advertised far below its market
value, ie $66 instead of $3,854. According to the objective theory, the sellers who
owned the website would have been obliged to sell the printers at the erroneous
prices. After discovering the error, the sellers informed those who placed orders
that they would not be fulfilling them. A number of disgruntled customers sued to
enforce the purported contracts at the incorrect prices. After restating the need for
certainty inherent in the objective theory of contract, the High Court focused on the
state of mind of the plaintiffs (ie the addressees of the erroneous statement). The
Court described their opportunistic attitude, educational background and IT literacy.
Some importance was also attributed to their honesty.118 The most controversial
issue was, however, the “knowledge possessed and/or belief entertained by each of
115 Smith v Hughes, supra note 69 at 607.
116 For a detailed discussion see Stephen A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract, 6th ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 76, 77; Treitel, supra note 44 at para 8-045.
117 See generally McMeel, supra note 71 at paras 3.12-3.38.
118 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at paras 142-144.
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the plaintiffs.”119 When seeking to establish what the plaintiffs knew or should have
known, the High Court emphasised that they had “readily accessible means from
the very same computer screen”120 to ascertain the seller’s true intention. It must
be emphasised that the Court did not seek to import subjective elements into the
discussion. Quite the opposite; the question was whether the belief that the seller
was willing to contract on extremely low prices was reasonable in light of what was
or should have been known. The knowledge of the plaintiffs was evaluated against
an objective standard. Transposing this reasoning to our analysis, it can be assumed
that the principle that “a man is taken to have known what would have been obvious
to a reasonable person in the light of the surrounding circumstances”121 applies to
both users and operators. Users must not resort to the objective approach if their
belief in the unrestricted availability of website resources does not correspond with
what they know or should know. At the same time, we must acknowledge the differ-
ence between the situation in Digilandmall, where a statement containing an obvious
error cannot justify a belief in its accuracy and a situation where a belief that web-
site content and services are ‘free’ is based on a statement that can be considered
ambiguous and/or the addressee’s subjective assumptions. In the former instance,
the addressee knows that the statement does not represent the subjective intention of
its maker. In the latter, such intention may not be obvious but the addressee makes
no effort to ascertain it. He assumes that no exchange is necessary and that there
is no contract. In both instances the addressee cannot be considered reasonable in
light of what he should have known. The Court stated that although carelessness
did not prevent a party from invoking the doctrine of mistake, knowledge of certain
facts had to be imputed if it appeared that by exercising reasonable care the true
facts ought to be known.122 The Court of Appeal confined the holding of the High
Court to actual knowledge of the mistake, but emphasised that knowledge had to
be proven like any other fact. Phrases such as “must have known” were evidential
factors used in finding that the non-mistaken party did in fact know of the mis-
take.123 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal equated actual knowledge with “wilful
blindness” and debated the type of circumstances under which a person should make
an inquiry.124 Following Digilandmall, it could be argued that a reasonable user
would notice the legal link and examine its relevance. His assumption that the web-
site resources are available without the need for reciprocity would be irrelevant if
it did not correspond with what he knew or should have known. It could, however,
also be debated whether operators know (or believe) that most users do not intend to
contract or are browsing the website on the mistaken assumption that its resources
are available without restrictions. The answer will depend on an objective interpre-
tation of the user’s behaviour on the website. The test, in relation to “whether a
119 Ibid at para 11; see also Andrew Phang, “Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace” (2005) 21
Journal of Contract Law 197 at 202; Lee Pey Woan, “Unilateral Mistake in Law and Equity—Solle v
Butcher Reinstated” (2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law 81.
120 Digilandmall, supra note 1 at para 146.
121 Ibid at para 112.
122 Ibid at para 146.
123 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR (R) 502 at para 35 (CA) [Digilandmall
(CA)]; see also Centrovincial Estates PLC v Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd [1983] Com LR 158
(CA).
124 Digilandmall (CA), supra note 123 at para 42.
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person ought to have realised that a mistake had been made, was not what the actual
intentions of each party were but what each party was entitled to conclude from the
attitude of the other.”125 Operators must share the understanding of a reasonable
man. If a user so conducts himself that “a reasonable man would believe that he
was assenting to the terms proposed”126 the user will be bound. As indicated, the
evaluation of the user’s behaviour will depend on the significance attributed to the
presence of terms (ie legal link) and the type of content or services made available
on the website. Is it reasonable for a user to expect that they are provided without
restrictions?
IV. Final Observations
Contracts governing the use of website resources will continue to create contro-
versies. Although the legal principles that are relevant to their enforceability seem
well-established and uncontroversial, their practical application in the online envi-
ronment is far from straightforward. The objective theory of contract must allow
for the fact that the person seeking its protection, the website operator, may be the
one who created the appearances of agreement. At the same time, despite objective
appearances the website user may seek to escape liability on the basis that he did
not have the requisite intention to be legally bound. His denial of intention will rest,
almost exclusively, on an alleged absence of transactional awareness deriving from
an expectation that website resources are free. Moreover, as the principles of contract
formation become intertwined with the principles concerning the incorporation of
terms, it becomes necessary to determine whether—or to what extent—concepts of
from incorporation can be transposed to formation scenarios. This question is particu-
larly pertinent in the context of notice: can the concept of enhanced notice concerning
onerous terms be extended to alert the user that a contract is being formed? The out-
come of any discussion cannot be based on a single argument, but must involve a
careful consideration of multiple factors including the legal implications, if any, of
the presence of the legal link and the importance of user expectations. The conclu-
sion will largely depend on what is considered reasonable notice and what level of
inquisitiveness or what state of knowledge is expected from a reasonable Internet
user. Needless to say, defining a ‘reasonable user’ is impossible in the abstract.
The point of reference will vary depending on the jurisdiction. In countries such
as Singapore, which rank high in broadband penetration and IT literacy, users may
be held to a higher standard—both with regard to their presumed knowledge and
the reasonableness of their expectations. Arguably, if we were to strictly follow the
principles of contract law, the legal link might suffice. If, however, we were to allow
for the (relative) novelty of the online transaction environment, we might require
something more prominent or engaging than the legal link. It is difficult, however,
to derive such requirement from the principles of contract law. Each website must be
evaluated in casu, in light of the specific manner the terms have been presented and
in light of the reasonableness of the user’s expectations that the resources in question
should be ‘for free’. Admittedly, most users do not perceive online interactions as
125 OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers plc [1996] CLC 722 at 726.
126 Smith v Hughes, supra note 69 at 607.
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transactions and do not understand the commercial value of their information. They
continue to associate online contracting with companies like Amazon and eBay, not
with reading the news or performing Google searches. They also associate contract-
ing with the payment of money, and not with “pay-with-data exchanges”.127 Are
such assumptions and perceptions of continued relevance in 2016? We tend to refer
to all Internet-related phenomena as ‘novel’, frequently forgetting that the Internet
and the web have been part of social and commercial life for more than two decades.
There is nothing legally objectionable with operators requiring users (a) to abide by
certain rules as a precondition of using their services or accessing their content, and
(b) to provide something in return. In sum, if we access websites to obtain specific
content or services, it seems reasonable that such content or services are made condi-
tional on the formation of a contract. Expectations based on offline experiences may
not be reasonable if a particular online activity does not have an equivalent in real
life or if, despite some resemblance, it is qualitatively different. On a broader level,
it also seems unreasonable to expect that a benefit can be obtained gratuitously.
It must be noted that at the time of writing, website access restrictions such as
pay-walls and accounts are becoming increasingly popular. Operators face the dif-
ficult task of balancing user-friendliness with the need to protect their content and
lawfully extract user information. While legal links seem to be most user-friendly
and friction-less approach to contract formation, they are surrounded by legal uncer-
tainty. Although neither the actual communication of terms nor an express act of
consent (such as an additional click) are required by contract law, access restrictions
such as accounts usually involve more complex procedures that remedy any remain-
ing legal doubts and clearly convey that the use of given website is subject to a set
of terms that prescribe not only the permitted range of activities but also indicate
the need to provide something in return. Paradoxically, the very procedures that
are designed to communicate that a transaction is taking place constitute a source
of frequent frustration. Users are forced to remember multiple log-in details, such
as passwords. Moreover, all access restrictions slow down the browsing process.
There is an inevitable trade-off between user-friendliness and the unequivocal com-
munication that continued browsing is conditional on the formation of a contract. As
outlined above, most arguments concerning the enforceability of website contracts
converge on the fact that Internet users do not expect browsing to be governed by
contract. Because users do not expect to pay for access (with their personal informa-
tion or otherwise), they do not see the context as commercial, they do not analyse the
website in terms of offers or invitations to treat and claim a total lack of transactional
awareness. A denial of contractual intention must, however, be based on something
more than an expectation that online resources are gratuitous. Our conclusions must
be based on an objective assessment of what the operator makes available on his
website, including the visibility of the legal link, and the manner in which the users
interacts with the website. While unreasonable expectations cannot dictate legal out-
comes, appearances can. Ultimately, any discussion of the enforceability of contracts
governing the use of websites must be supplemented with an analysis of broader pol-
icy considerations. As indicated at the outset, the substantive provisions of contracts
purporting to govern the use and access to online resource often create intersections
127 Warner & Sloan, “Behavioral Advertising”, supra note 11 at 55.
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with other areas of law such as intellectual property and privacy protection regimes.
In such instances, material issues from those areas may override the principles of
contract law. The question “are such contracts enforceable?” is replaced with the
inquiry “should they be enforceable?” Unfortunately, this inquiry must be reserved
for a separate paper.
